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NOTES
CONNICK V MYERS: NARROWING THE FREE
SPEECH RIGHT OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES
The first amendment's guarantee of free speech, the United States
Supreme Court has held, is not absolute.' As Justice Holmes observed, the
right does not extend to one who falsely shouts fire in a crowded theatre.2
Similarly, the right of free speech does not protect one who knowingly or
recklessly makes false statements,' makes false advertising claims,4 or pub-
lishes obscenity.5 In each of these areas, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized the conflict of rights between the speaker and the intended recipient,
and has balanced those rights to the point that "we can have both full
liberty of expression and an orderly life."6 The Court has also recognized
that each instance of restricting free speech is necessarily a question of
degree,7 ever mindful of the danger of suppressing speech that should be
heard.8
The danger of suppressing speech also arises in cases involving free
speech of public employees.9 As in other areas, the Supreme Court has
imposed certain limitations on the first amendment rights of these employ-
1. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951). Among the cases in which the
Supreme Court has limited the free speech right are Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298 (1974) (political advertising on city buses); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49 (1973) (obscenity); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (circular urging noncom-
pliance with conscription laws in time of war).
2. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. at 52.
3. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
4. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
5. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
6. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951) (free speech does not mean the abso-
lute right to talk when and how one chooses, but must take into account the rights of others).
7. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. at 52.
8. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 292 (the possibility that good faith
criticism of the government, for example, will be suppressed is inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the first amendment).
9. The term "public employee" in this note refers to employees at the local, state, or
federal level. The first cases in which the free speech rights of public employees arose are
cited infra note 34.
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ees, particularly when they make statements critical of their employer.
The standard to be applied in determining whether a public employee's
statements are beyond the first amendment's protection was stated by the
Court over a decade ago.") That standard requires a balancing between
"the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters
of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promot-
ing the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees." i'
In the past fifteen years, the Court has had occasion to apply this stan-
dard in a variety of settings. Although more recent cases have clarified the
factors to be considered, the basic test has remained unchanged. The test
requires striking a balance between the right of the employee to speak on
public matters'" and the right of the employer to effectively control and
manage its organization.' 3 It was against this background that the
Supreme Court decided Connick v. Myers,' 4 upholding the firing of a pub-
lic employee against her claim that her free speech rights were violated.
This decision, by a sharply divided Court,' 5 indicates the narrowing scope
of first amendment rights in the public employee arena. Whereas previous
refinements of the balancing test centered upon the method to be used and
the factors to be considered in striking the proper balance between the
employee's right to speak and the employer's right to manage efficiently,
the Connick Court focused its attention on whether application of the test
was necessary. The Court held that when the speech of the public em-
ployee may be categorized as a matter not of public concern, no balancing
is necessary and the state may prohibit such speech.' 6
Sheila Myers was an Assistant District Attorney for the Parish of New
Orleans who, when informed by her supervisor that she was to be trans-
ferred to another section of criminal court, expressed opposition to the
10. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
11. Id. at 568.
12. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (the right of free
speech occupies "the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values") (quoting
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
13. Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part)
("the Government's interest, and hence the public's interest, is the maintenance of employee
efficiency and discipline. Such factors are essential if the Government is to perform its re-
sponsibilities effectively and economically").
14. Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983).
15. Id. In a five to four decision, Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court,
joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Justice
Brennan wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
16. 1d. at 1694.
[Vol. 33:429
Connick v. Myers
move." In response to her proposed transfer, Myers prepared a question-
naire and circulated it among her coworkers, seeking their views on such
issues as office morale, the need for a grievance committee and the man-
agement pressure to work on political campaigns.18  Harry Connick,
Myer's supervisor and the District Attorney for the Parish, notified Myers
on the day she circulated the questionnaire that she was terminated as of 5
o'clock. 9 Connick cited Myer's refusal to accept the transfer and her in-
subordination in distributing the questionnaire as the dual grounds for her
firing."0 Myers filed suit in federal district court, claiming that her termi-
nation was in violation of her first amendment rights and that the circula-
tion of the questionnaire was protected speech.2 The district court upheld
Myer's claim and ordered her reinstated, ruling that the questionnaire in-
volved matters of public concern and that its circulation did not unduly
17. Id. at 1686.
18. The full text of the questionnaire read:
Please take the few minutes it will require to fill this out. You can freely express
your opinion WITH ANONYMITY GUARANTEED.
1. How long have you been in the Office?
2. Were you moved as a result of the recent transfers?
3. Were the transfers as they effected [sic] you discussed with you by any supe-
rior prior to the notice of them being posted?
4. Do you think as a matter of policy, they should have been?
5. From your experience, do you feel office procedure regarding transfers has
been fair?
6. Do you believe there is a rumor mill active in the office?
7. If so, how do you think it effects [sic] overall working performance of A.D.A.
personnel?
8. If so, how do you think it effects [sic] office morale?
9. Do you generally first learn of office changes and developments through ru-
mor?






11. Do you ever feel pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of
office supported candidates?
12. Do you feel a grievance committee would be a worthwhile addition to the
office structure?
13. How would you rate office morale?
14. Please feel free to express any comments or feelings you have.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION IN THIS SURVEY.
Id. at 1694, Appendix A.
19. Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 755 (E.D La. 1981), a f'd without opinion, 654
F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983).
20. 507 F. Supp. at 755.
21. Id at 756.
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interfere with the efficiency of government operations.22 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed without an
opinion.23
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.24 Writing for the majority,
Justice White held that the speech in this case did not involve a matter of
public concern. 25 Indeed, stated the Court, this case involved a public em-
ployee speaking on a matter of purely personal interest.26 There was
therefore no need to apply the balancing test, because the state's interest in
serving the public will always outweigh the employee's personal interest.
27
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan maintained that Myers' ques-
tionnaire was a matter of public concern because it was speech concerning
the effective operation of a public agency.28 In such a situation, the dissent
reasoned, courts must balance the employee's free speech rights against the
state's public service interests to determine whether first amendment rights
have been unfairly infringed. Applying that balancing test, the dissent as-
serted that an infringement of the employee's rights did in fact occur.29 In
the view of the four dissenting justices, the personnel policies and morale
of the District Attorney's office constituted a matter of public concern.3"
The dissent concluded that in failing to recognize the public concern in-
volved, the majority impermissively narrowed the subjects on which a
public employee may speak without fear of retaliatory dismissal.3
This Note will examine the Connick decision and explain how the Court
has narrowed the range of topics which public employees can claim as first
amendment speech in criticizing their employers. Despite the Court's as-
surance that its holding "is no defeat for the First Amendment, '"32 an ex-
amination of Connick in the context of previous applications of the
balancing test will reveal a significant narrowing of the rights of public
employees.33 This Note will conclude that in narrowing these rights, the
22. Id at 759.
23. Myers v. Connick, 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981).
24. Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1694 (1983).
25. Id at 1690.
26. Id
27. Id
28. Id at 1695 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. Id
30. Id at 1696.
31. Id
32. Id at 1694.
33. For a general review of Supreme Court rulings on free speech, see Emerson, First
Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422 (1980) (concluding that
although the traditional values of the first amendment remain intact, those values are less
well served by the Burger Court than by the Warren Court); contra, Cox, The Supreme Court
[Vol. 33:429
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Supreme Court has made understanding of the bounds of public employ-
ees' free speech rights more difficult and thus may have increased the po-
tential for litigation in this area.
I. RECOGNITION OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES
A. The Loyalty Oath Cases and Freedom of Association
Long before the Supreme Court recognized the principle of free speech
for public employees, it considered the question of whether they were enti-
tled to constitutional protection under the first amendment. This question
was answered in the negative in the nineteenth century, with the Court
adopting Justice Holmes' view that "[a policeman] may have a constitu-
tional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman."34
The eventual foundation for public employee free speech rights evolved
from this initial narrow view through a series of cases involving freedom of
association. In these cases, the factual setting centered around a state re-
quirement that public employees (schoolteachers) take loyalty oaths.35 In
1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 70 (1980) (concluding that the Warren Court's first amend-
ment gains remain uneroded). For an examination of free speech rights of public employ-
ees, see Note, Free Speech Rights of Public School Teachers: A Proposed Balancing Test, 30
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 673 (1981); see also Note, Limiting Public Expression by Public Employees.
The Validity of Catchall Regulations, 18 HoUSTON L. REV. 1097 (1981); Stevens, Balancing
Speech and Efficiency. The Educator's Freedom of Expression after Pickering, 8 J.L. & EDUC.
223 (1979).
34. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892).
The Supreme Court expressed this view in Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952);
Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); United Public Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75 (1947); United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930); and Ex Parte Curtis,
106 U.S. 371 (1882).
35. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967) ("constitutional doctrine
• ..has rejected ...[the] premise . ..that public employment, including academic em-
ployment, may be conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights which could not
be abridged by direct government action"); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S.
278, 287 (1961) ("[t]he vice of unconstitutional vagueness is further aggravated where, as
here, the statute in question operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirma-
tively protected by the Constitution"); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960) ("Itlhe
statute's comprehensive interference with associational freedom goes far beyond what might
be justified in the exercise of the State's legitimate inquiry into the fitness and competency of
its teachers"); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957) ("[olur conclusion does
rest upon a separation of the power of a state legislature to conduct investigations from the
responsibility to direct the use of that power insofar as that separation causes a deprivation
of the constitutional rights of individuals"); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952)
("constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a
statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory").
19841
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the first of these, Wieman v. Updegraff,36 a loyalty oath excluding from
public employment persons who had innocent association with certain
subversive organizations was held unconstitutional.37 Distinguishing its
earlier rulings to the contrary,38 the Court held that indiscriminate classifi-
cation of innocent association with knowing association in subversive or-
ganizations was "an assertion of arbitrary power ' 39 by the state. Where, as
here, mere membership is automatically equated with loyalty, the effect is
to unduly inhibit freedom of association.4" The Court held that by indis-
criminately requiring all employees who had any past association with
subversive organizations to take the loyalty oath, irrespective of the fact
that their association was entirely innocent, the state exceeded the bounds
of due process.41 Thus, the Court recognized that unduly burdensome re-
strictions on public employees were not compatible with the purposes of
the first amendment.
Although Wieman was clearly a freedom of association case, Justice
Black noted in his concurring opinion that loyalty oaths may be used as
effective means of suppressing public employees' free speech.42 Expressing
fear that loyalty oaths and other "tools of tyranny"4 3 could be used to
suppress the first amendment rights of public employees, Justice Black
concluded that "the right to speak on matters of public concern must be
wholly free or eventually be wholly lost."" This was the first time that a
member of the Supreme Court had acknowledged the principle that public
employees should have the right to free speech.
Justice Black's concern with free speech of public employees in Wieman
36. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
37. Id. at 192 (the Court did not directly refute Holmes' observation concerning the
constitutional right to be a policeman, but stated only "[wie need not pause to consider
whether an abstract right to public employment exists").
38. Id. at 191.
39. Id.
40. Id
41. Id ("[t]o thus inhibit individual freedom of movement is to stifle the flow of demo-
cratic expression and controversy at one of its chief sources").
42. Id. at 192-93 (Black, J., concurring) ("[t]he Oklahoma oath statute is but one mani-
festation of a national network of laws aimed at coercing and controlling the minds of
men").
43. Id. at 193.
44. Id
45. See Connick, 103 S. Ct. at 1685 (citing Wieman, 344 U.S. 183). Further support for
this view was found in the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter who emphasized the
proposition that teachers must have freedom of speech in order to properly perform their




was echoed by the Supreme Court eight years later in Shelton v. Tucker.46
As in Wieman, Shelton involved a state statute requiring public employees
to identify both innocent and knowing association with any organization
to which they had belonged within the preceding five years. 47 Shelton, a
school teacher in Little Rock, refused to sign an affidavit listing member-
ship in organizations to which he had belonged, and was subsequently
fired.48 He challenged as overly broad the constitutionality of the Arkan-
sas statute, which required disclosure of every kind of associational tie,
including those that had no bearing on his competence as a teacher.49 The
Supreme Court sustained Shelton's challenge, and held that a state's indis-
criminate requirement that public employees disclose membership in all
organizations was an abuse of due process." Although Shelton concerned
freedom of association and not speech, the Court cited Justice Frank-
furter's concurrence in Wieman,"' reiterating its concern that the public
employee's right to free speech not be unduly abridged. 2
A year later, in Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction," the Court struck
down a loyalty oath requiring a sworn statement that the employee had
never aided or supported the communist party. 4 Cramp, a Florida public
school teacher, refused to sign the oath, stating that although, to the best of
his understanding, he had not done any of the activities forbidden by the
statute, the vagueness of the law made it unconstitutional.55 He was fired,
and appealed his firing to the Supreme Court as a violation of his first
amendment rights of speech and association. The Court held that the stat-
utory language of the oath was so vague that the state could not rely on an
employee's refusal to sign as the basis for his termination.56  Citing
Wieman for the proposition that public employees may not be fired from
public employment pursuant to arbitrary or discriminatory statutes, the
46. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
47. Id. at 480.
48. Id. at 483.
49. Id. at 487-88.
50. Id at 490.
51. Id. at 487 (citing Wieman, 344 U.S. at 195 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). The
Shelon Court's extensive quoting from Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Wieman
apparently reflects an appreciation for his particular manner of voicing the Court's concern,
for Wieman was without dissent. In Wieman, Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the
Court, and Justices Black and Frankfurter filed separate concurrences.
52. Id at 486. The Court used similar reasoning in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,
495-96 (1961), ruling that a denial of a commission to a notary public who would not declare
his belief in God violated his first amendment right to freedom of belief.
53. 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
54. 1d. at 287.
55. Id. at 282.
56. Id. at 287.
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Court reaffirmed the holding that public employees should enjoy protec-
tion from unconstitutional infringement on first amendment rights.57
Similarly, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,58 the Supreme Court found
that a loyalty oath used by the State of New York was so vague and over-
broad as to be unconstitutional. In Keyishian, faculty members of the
State University of New York were fired for their refusal to sign an oath.
In holding that the statute requiring the oath was unconstitutional as
vague and overbroad,59 the Court reiterated its position that a public em-
ployer could not require employees to surrender first amendment freedoms
as a condition of employment.6 ° Moreover, the Supreme Court applauded
the lower court's declaration that "the theory that public employment
which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, re-
gardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected."'" As in its
previous rulings, the Court held that although there was no entitlement to
public employment, the state, having hired an employee, must nonetheless
provide fundamental constitutional guarantees to the employee-here,
freedom from unduly restrictive loyalty oaths.62
In these loyalty oath cases, the Court emphasized the danger of impos-
ing overzealous and arbitrary requirements on state employees. In striking
down infringements on speech and association in the form of vaguely
worded loyalty oaths, the Court clearly enunciated the right of public em-
ployees to be free of unduly burdensome restrictions on their first amend-
ment rights.63  Having declared that right, however, the Court was
57. Id. at 288 (citing Wieman, 344 U.S. at 192).
58. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
59. Id. at 604.
60. Id. at 602.
61. Id. at 605-06 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir.
1965)).
62. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 610-18 (the statute required faculty members of the Uni-
versity to certify to the University President that they were not communists, had never been
communists, and neither advocated nor belonged to an organization that advocated forceful
overthrow of the government); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 279 (1961)
(the statute required Florida public employees to swear they had never lent "aid, support,
advice, counsel or influence to the Communist Party"); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 481-
82 n. 1(1960) (the statute required every Arkansas teacher to file an affidavit listing member-
ship in and association with all organizations over the preceding five-year period); Wieman,
344 U.S. at 184-85 (the statutory loyalty oath excluded persons from employment with the
State of Oklahoma solely on the basis of membership in certain communist front or subver-
sive organizations, regardless of their knowledge of the organization's purposes and
activities).
63. A decade after Wieman the Court struck down as violative of the first amendment
South Carolina's denial of unemployment compensation to a Seventh Day Adventist who
refused Saturday work in Sherbert v. Verner, 394 U.S. 398 (1963). The Sherbert Court
noted that "[ilt is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression
[Vol. 33:429
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confronted with the more difficult task of defining the circumstances under
which a public employee's free speech rights must yield to the employer's
right to manage.
B. The Free Speech Right on Matters of Public Concern
The loyalty oath cases established the public employee's entitlement to
fundamental constitutional guarantees of association and speech. How-
ever, because these cases were decided on the grounds of vagueness and
overbreadth, they provided public employers with little guidance with re-
gard to the nature and extent of the conditions the state could place on the
free speech rights of public employees. It was not until the Supreme
Court's decision in Pickering v. Board of Education'4 that any significant
guidance was provided to public employers on the scope of a public em-
ployee's free speech rights. In Pickering, a teacher was dismissed for writ-
ing a letter to the newspaper criticizing the school board and the
superintendent of schools for the way in which budget allocations were
made between academics and athletics.65 The Court held that absent
proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by the school
teacher, his firing was an impermissible infringement on his protected
speech.66 Citing Keyishian for the proposition that public employment
could not be subjected to unreasonable restrictions,67 Pickering held that
the employee's interest in commenting on a matter of public concern must
be balanced against the state's interest in promoting the efficiency of the
may be infringed by the denial of or placing conditions upon a benefit or privilege." 374
U.S. at 404.
64. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
65. Id. at 564, 566.
66. Id. at 574. The Court in Pickering noted that the core value of the first amendment
right of free speech was "[tihe public interest in having free and unhindered debate on mat-
ters of public importance." Id at 573. Of added importance was the fact that the employee's
speech was exercised through the press. Id In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court
held that unless statements about a public official are shown to have been made either with
knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity, recovery of
damages by that public official is not authorized by the state. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
The Court's continuing concern with protecting the right of free speech and a free press was
exemplified by Chief Justice Warren's statement in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts: "Our
citizenry has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of [public officials] and
freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public
issues and events is . . .crucial." 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in
result).
67. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (citing Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605-06). The theory that
because there is no entitlement to public employment, employees who work for the state
may be subjected to any conditions, no matter how unreasonable, has been absolutely re-
jected by the Supreme Court. Id.
1984]
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public service."
The balancing test enunciated in Pickering was framed in somewhat
general terms. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, candidly expressed
the impracticality of attempting to anticipate the myriad of circumstances
which would inevitably arise in cases of public employees who challenge
their firings as violations of the right of free speech.6 9 Rather than estab-
lishing a universal standard against which all assertedly protected state-
ments may be judged,7" the Court identified certain factors to be
considered in striking the proper balance between the first amendment
rights of public employees and the proper exercise of managerial authority
by state employers. 7
The first factor to consider in applying the balancing test is the parties'
working relationship.7" Pickering's letter to the newspaper was critical of
his employer-the school board-but was not directed at his supervisors
with whom he would have to maintain a close working relationship.73 The
Court reasoned that the distant nature of the public employee's working
relationship with the object of the employee's criticism is a factor weighing
in favor of the employee in the application of the balancing test." It em-
phasized that in Pickering there was neither a question of the ability to
maintain discipline by immediate superiors nor a demonstration of dishar-
68. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. The Court thus refused to characterize the right of pub-
lic employees to speak on matters of public concern as "wholly free," as Justice Black had
urged in Wieman, 344 U.S. at 193. The Pickering Court recognized the legitimate role of the
public employer as a manager, noting that "it cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests
as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it
possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general." 391 U.S.
at 568. But, Justice Marshall noted, to the extent the Illinois Supreme Court required Pick-
ering to refrain from exercising his first amendment right to express his views as a citizen on
a matter of public concern by writing a letter to the newspaper, the court "proceed[ed] on a
premise that has been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this Court." Id
69. Id. at 569.
70. Id
71. 1d. at 569-73. The Court indicated "some of the general lines along which an analy-
sis of the controlling interests should run" in evaluating the conflicting claims of free speech
and orderly administration of a public agency. Id at 569. It left open the possibility that
factors other than those applicable in Pickering might well be controlling in other cases, due
to the "enormous variety of fact situations in which critical statements by teachers and other
public employees may be thought by their superiors, against whom the statements are di-
rected, to furnish grounds for dismissal." Id.
72. Id. at 570.
73. Id at 569-73.
74. Id. at 570. Although Pickering was not in a close working relationship with the
school board, the Court noted that a different result might arise in a case where it could
"persuasively be claimed that personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to [a public
employee's] proper functioning." Id.
[Vol. 33:429
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mony among coworkers.75 Thus, the Court suggested that a close working
relationship between the employee and the managers who are the subjects
of the employee's criticism could tip the balance in favor of the employer's
right to limit free speech.
7 6
The second factor the Pickering Court considered was the detrimental
effect of the employee's statement on the employer-that is, how well the
public agency could continue to accomplish its mission in light of the em-
ployee's statements on a matter of public concern.7 7 The Court refused to
agree with the employer's assertion that any publicly made false statement
by the employee was per se harmful to the employer.78 Rather, the nature
and content of the statement must be examined in order to make a case-
by-case determination of detrimental impact of the statement on the effi-
ciency of the public service.7 9 Where, as here, the so-called false statement
in part amounted to a difference of opinion over proper allocation of
school board funds (a matter of public concern),8° the mere airing of an
employee's difference of opinion with his employer in a public forum did
not have sufficient detrimental effect to justify termination of the em-
ployee.8' In the Court's view, the statement did not have a per se detri-
mental effect.82 Thus, the greater the potential detrimental effect the
statement may have on the employer's ability to function, the greater the
need of the employer to control the employee's speech, tipping the Picker-
ing balance in the employer's favor.8 3
75. Id
76. Compare Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (the employee, a field repre-
sentative in the Chicago Regional Office of the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity,
worked for the Regional Director; his discharge for making recklessly false statements about
the Regional Director was upheld with the Court noting that "prolonged retention of a dis-
ruptive . . . employee can adversely affect discipline and morale in the work place [and]
foster disharmony") with NLRB v. Magnavox Co. of Tenn. 415 U.S. 322, 326-27 (1974) (the
employees, factory workers who wished to distribute union literature in nonwork areas of
company property, prevailed in their claim that the employer's blanket rule against distribu-
tion on company property was a violation of their section 7 rights under the National Labor
Relations Act; the Court stated "this is not the occasion to balance the availability of alter-
native channels of communication against a legitimate employer business justification for
barring or limiting in-plant communications").
77. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570.
78. Id at 571.
79. Id.
80. Id. ("the question whether a school system requires additional funds is a matter of
legitimate public concern").
81. Id. at 572-73.
82. Id. at 571.
83. Id. at 572. The Court alluded to the possibility that certain types of public employ-
ees' statements would tip the balance in the employer's favor. Here, Pickering's letter could
easily be rebutted by the school board writing a reply to the newspaper. Id. Other instances
19841
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A third factor the Court identified as important for striking a proper
balance between free speech and efficiency of the public service was the
nature and complexity of the issue upon which the employee spoke and the
relationship of the employee to that issue.84 In Pickering, the question was
whether a school system needed more money-clearly a matter of public
concern.85 The Court noted that the issue would be resolved through pop-
ular vote via the referendum process, thereby requiring free and open de-
bate.86 As school teachers, Pickering and his co-workers were "the
members of the community most likely to have informed and definite
opinions' 87 on the matter. In the Court's view, it is imperative that the
most informed members of the community, the public employees, be able
to exercise their right to free speech on matters of public concern.88 Thus,
just as a court must examine the content of the statement to determine the
possible detrimental effect, the content of the statement together with the
employee's possible expertise on the issue must also be considered to deter-
mine the possible benefit to the public that may be gained by allowing the
employee to speak. In evaluating the employee's relationship to the issue,
where there is a close nexus between the employee and the issue, the possi-
bility that the employee will make a valuable contribution to public under-
standing will tip the scales in favor of protecting his free speech.89
of speech, however, involving "false statements about matters so closely related to the day-
to-day operations of the schools that any harmful impact on the public would be difficult to
counter," or involving matters requiring redress through "narrowly drawn grievance proce-
dures" would make it more difficult to resolve the Pickering balance in the employee's favor.
1d. & n.4. It was even possible, the Court held, to have "completely correct public state-
ments. . . furnish[ing] a permissible ground for dismissal" if the working relationship factor
was great enough. Id. at 570 n.3.
84. Id. at 572.
85. Id. at 571. Pickering's letter consisted of an attack on the allocation of funds be-
tween educational and athletic programs by the school board ("These things are all right,
provided we have enough money for them. To sod football fields on borrowed money and
then not be able to pay teachers' salaries is getting the cart before the horse.") and the
board's handling of the bond proposal to raise the funds ("do you know that the superinten-
dent told the teachers, and I quote, 'Any teacher that opposes the referendum should be
prepared for the consequences.' I think this gets at the reason we have problems passing
bond issues"). Id at 576-77 (Appendix A).
86. Id. at 571-72.
87. Id at 572.
88. Id
89. Id at 572-74. Support for the Court's view that an informed publc employee should
be able to speak out on a matter of public concern is found in Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN
THE UNITED STATES 6 (1941) (to the framers of the Constitution, freedom of speech meant
the right of unrestricted discussion of public affairs); contra, L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRES-
SION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 236-37 (1960) (the
framers of the Constitution did not believe in a broad right of freedom of expression, partic-
ularly in the field of politics).
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The Pickering test was thus both a broad framework of balancing the
free speech right of the employee with the management right of the em-
ployer, and, within that framework, a more specific weighing of the factors
noted above. After carefully considering the effect on working relation-
ships, the detrimental impact on the employer, and the nature of the mat-
ter of public concern, the Court would arrive at a final determination of
whether a given statement was protected speech.9° Later applications of
Pickering indicated a refinement of both the test and the factors to be
weighed in its application.9'
The first refinement of the Pickering test concerned the third factor
noted above, the nature of the issue and the employee's relationship to that
issue. In Perry v. Sindermann,92 a college professor, Sindermann, became
active in an association representing teachers at Texas junior colleges and
in that capacity testified at hearings before the Texas State Legislature. 93
Specifically, Sindermann testified in favor of a proposal to elevate all jun-
ior colleges in the state, including the one at which he taught, to four year
institutions. This change was opposed by the Board of Regents of Odessa
State College, where Sindermann was employed.94 Sindermann's employ-
ment contract was not renewed, and he filed suit claiming the decision not
to rehire him was in retaliation for his public opposition to the policies of
his employer, and was thus a violation of his free speech right.95
The Supreme Court agreed with Sindermann that the issue of whether
he could be fired for his statements presented a bona fide constitutional
claim, and remanded the case for a determination on this matter. 96 In so
doing, the Court noted that criticism by a public employee of his superiors
may be constitutionally protected and thus may be an impermissible basis
for firing the employee.97 Sindermann was both a teacher in the system
proposed to be changed and a spokesman for the Teacher's Association.98
90. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573. The Court was thus trying to ensure fulfillment of the
underlying purpose of the first amendment to allow "opportunities to contribute to public
debate." Id.
91. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (balancing the
right of a school teacher to give information adverse to his employer to the media with the
right of the employer to fire the employee); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (bal-
ancing the right of a college professor to testify before the state legislature with the em-
ployer's rights to refuse to renew the employee's work contract).
92. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
93. Id. at 594-95.
94. Id. at 595.
95. Id. at 595, 598.
96. Id.
97. Id. (the Court cited Pickering as the basis for its statement).
98. Id. at 594-95.
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Thus, he was a member of the general public who by virtue of his position
was likely to have special insight on the matter of public concern. There-
fore, the Pickering scales would be tipped somewhat in the employee's
favor. Perry thus served as a further illustration of the type of case in
which the Pickering balancing test should be applied, and again raised the
view that public employees, as citizens with an informed view, should be
able to speak on matters of public concern.
The second refinement of the Pickering test came with the Supreme
Court's ruling in Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle.99 This decision clarified the burden of proof an employer must
meet in terminating an employee under the Pickering test."° In Mount
Healthy, an untenured schoolteacher (Doyle) called a local radio station
and reported the establishment of a dress code for teachers.' 0 ' The radio
station subsequently publicized the report as a news item.'0 2 The school
board fired Doyle at the end of the school year, citing the adverse publicity
he had caused as a principal basis for its action.0 3 The Supreme Court
agreed with the district court's finding that Doyle's call to the radio station
constituted free speech on a matter of public concern.' °4 Moreover, the
Court held that the Pickering test was applicable to the situation. The
Court disagreed with the lower court, however, on the extent to which
Doyle had to show that his firing was due to the exercise of his free speech
rights in order to overturn the action.0 5
99. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
100. See Note, Nonpartisan Speech in the Police Department. The Aftermath of Pickering,
7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1001, 1015-17 (1980) (although Mt. Healthy clarified the burden of
proof to be met "by establishing a generally applicable standard, judicial application of the
Pickering balancing test still requires a case-by-case analysis of the relative weights to be
assigned to various governmental and free speech interests").
101. Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 282.
102. Id
103. Id. at 283 n.l. Doyle was also cited for unprofessional conduct and using obscene
gestures in dealing with students. Apart from these charges, the facts of Mount Healthy were
thus analogous to Pickering: both cases involved school teachers commenting on matters of
public concern by use of the news media; in both cases, the school teachers were fired for
exercising their free speech rights; and in both cases the Court balanced the competing inter-
ests of free speech and the right to discipline employees to conclude that a violation of first
amendment rights had occurred.
104. Id. at 284.
105. Id. at 284-85. The Supreme Court reviewed the lower court's conclusion that
Doyle's protected conduct played a substantial part in the decision not to renew his teaching
contract. The Supreme Court rejected the view that "the fact that the protected conduct
played a 'substantial part' in the actual decision not to renew would necessarily amount to a
constitutional violation justifying remedial action." Id at 285. Rather, something more than




At the trial court, Doyle showed that the exercise of his free speech right
played a "substantial part"' 6 in the decision to terminate him. The dis-
trict court held that this showing fulfilled his burden of proving that the
action as a whole was unconstitutional.° 7 The Supreme Court overturned
the lower court on the level of proof required. It apparently feared that
justified firings would be overturned if an employee merely invoked a pro-
tected conduct claim.' 08 The Court speculated that by merely requiring an
employee to prove that his protected conduct played a substantial part in
his firing, an employee could be placed "in a better position as a result of
the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have oc-
cupied had he done nothing."'0 9 To avoid this result, the Court held that
the proper burden is initially on the employee to show he was engaged in
constitutionally protected conduct, and that this conduct was a "motivat-
ing factor"'" in the decision to fire him. Once this prima facie showing is
made, the burden shifts to the employer to show, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the termination would have occurred irrespective of the
protected activity."'
Thus, Mount Healthy clarified the burden of proof required under the
Pickering test. Even if the employee could show that applying the Picker-
ing balance to his protected speech would result in a finding that he could
not be terminated for that conduct, Mount Healthy made it clear that the
analysis did not end there. If the employer could show that irrespective of
the protected conduct it would still have taken the action, then the termi-
nation of the employee would stand. In this way, the Mount Healthy deci-
sion added a significant hurdle to be cleared by an employee claiming the
protection of Pickering."2
A third refinement of the Pickering test came soon after Mount Healthy
106. Id
107. Id. at 284-85.
108. Id. at 285-86.
109. Id at 285 ("The difficulty with the rule enunciated by the District Court is that it
would require reinstatement in cases where a dramatic and perhaps abrasive incident is
inevitably on the minds of those responsible for the decision to rehire, and does indeed play
a part in that decision-even if the same decision would have been reached had the incident
not occurred").
110. Id. at 287.
I11. Id.
112. Although the Mount Healthy standard requires the employee to make a showing
that a substantial factor in his or her termination was the exercise of free speech, it has been
argued that the Mount Healthy test places the employee in a better position than he or she
would have been had no protected speech been made. See Note, supra note 100 at 10 16-17.
Thus, the employee "forces the state to demonstrate that the employment would have been
terminated even absent the protected activity. Since presumably the state will find it difficult
to make such a showing, placing this burden on the employer improves the employee's posi-
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in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District. 1 3 Givhan, a
school teacher, had a series of private meetings with her employer at which
she expressed concerns that certain school board policies were racially dis-
criminatory.' 14 She was subsequently fired and claimed her firing was in
retaliation for exercising her free speech rights on a matter of public con-
cern. The Court agreed with Givhan's contention, and declared that an
employee does not forfeit the right of free speech by private expression on
matters of public concern." 5 Givhan thus extended the Pickering test to
protected speech in a private setting. The Court stated that although Pick-
ering, Perry and Mount Healthy each involved circumstances in which the
employee's speech was a public expression, the rule to be derived from
those cases did not turn on that largely coincidental fact." 6
In addition to holding that the Pickering test could apply to private dis-
cussions between employee and employer, Givhan held that in determining
the proper balance between free speech and efficiency of the public service,
the time, place, and manner of the speech could be considered. "7 For
example, if the manner of speech was a confrontational declaration made
to an employee's immediate supervisor on a matter only tangentially char-
acterized as a matter of public concern, that speech stood substantially less
chance of striking the Pickering balance in the employee's favor. Still, the
Givhan Court held that the employee's statements to her supervisor, char-
acterized by her supervisor as "'insulting,' 'hostile,' 'loud,' and 'arro-
gant,' "''8 were protected speech on a matter of public concern not because
of the way in which the statements were made, but because the statements
involved discriminatory employment policies.' 9
Over a thirty year period, the Court had developed a rule which, al-
tion from what it would have been had the state not retaliated against his or her exercise of
protected speech." Id at 1017 (footnote omitted).
113. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
114. Id. at 412-13.
115. Id. at 414,
116. Id.
117. Id. at 415 n.4. The Court stated
[wlhen a teacher speaks publicly, it is generally the content of his statements that
must be assessed [under Pickering] . . . . Private expression, however, may in
some situations bring additional factors to the Pickering calculus . . . not only the
content of the employee's message but also the manner, time, and place in which it
is delivered.
Id. (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-73). In Pickering, Perry, and Mount Healthy the em-
ployee spoke publicly through the newspaper, the state legislature, and a radio station, re-
spectively. In Givhan, however, the Court noted "the fact that each of these cases involved
public expression by the employee was not critical to the decision." 439 U.S. at 415.
118. Id at 412.
119. Id at 413. The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for reconsideration
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though not a bright line, set forth certain factors to be considered in bal-
ancing the interests of the public employee in exercising first amendment
rights and the interests of the employer in maintaining management con-
trol. These cases uniformly failed to provide a definite standard for evalu-
ating the innumerable situations in which these interests would conflict.
Certain aspects of the standard, however, such as the balancing test, the
factors of that test, and the burden of proof to be met, were clearly stated.
Yet one aspect of the test was never directly addressed: what constituted a
matter of public concern.
A reading of these cases shows that the term 'matters of public concern"
included the allocation of school funds, 120 the structure of a state univer-
sity system, 12 1 the establishment of a faculty dress code,' 22 and whether
school policies were discriminatory. 123 In none of these cases was it ar-
gued that the speech of the employee was outside the ambit of the first
amendment because it was not a matter of public concern; yet certain com-
mon elements of these matters can be gleaned from a review of the deci-
sions. In each case, the subject matter which the employee claimed
constituted protected speech concerned the policy decisions of his or her
employer. In addition, the subject matter was assumed to be of interest to
the general public. 124 Furthermore, while each subject affected the em-
ployee personally, 125 that fact did not prevent the Court from characteriz-
ing it as a matter of public concern. An examination of Connick v. Myers
against this background reveals the narrowing approach taken by the
Court.
under the Mount Healthy standard, in light of its determination that the teacher's private
expression was protected speech. Id at 416-17.
120. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566.
121. Perry, 408 U.S. at 594-95.
122. Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 282.
123. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 413.
124. This was evidenced by the fact that the newspaper published the employee's letter in
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566, and the radio station publicized the employee's revelation of the
dress code in Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 282.
125. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 582 (the allocation of school funds affected Pickering as a
public school teacher in that it had an impact on his salary); Perry, 408 U.S. at 594-95 (the
elevation of Odessa Junior College to a four-year institution would affect Sindermann's em-
ployment as a professor at that institution); Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 282 (the board's
requirement that all teachers adhere to a dress code included Doyle, a public school
teacher); Givhan, 439 U.S. at 413 (the allegedly discriminatory policies of the school district
affected Givhan, a school teacher in the district).
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II. THE CONNICK DECISION
A. Defining a Matter of Public Concern
In determining whether an employee's right to speak on a matter of pub-
lic concern should yield to the state's right to manage, the threshold issue
would appear to be whether the speech involved is truly a matter of public
concern. Yet it was not until Connick v. Myers 126 that the United States
Supreme Court squarely confronted this question.
In Connick, the Court examined Myer's questionnaire to determine
whether it contained speech on a matter of public concern requiring appli-
cation of the Pickering test. Although the district court had examined the
speech and determined that it did address a matter of public concern,
27
the Supreme Court disagreed with this finding.128 Justice White, writing
for the majority, stated that the district court "got off on the wrong foot in
this case"' 29 by characterizing Myers' questionnaire as addressing a matter
of public concern. Had the lower court properly classified the speech, he
maintained, the balancing test would not have been applied to the ques-
tionnaire as a whole.' 3 ° In the Court's view, only the single question re-
garding pressure to work in political campaigns touched on a matter of
public concern.' 3 ' Thus, although Myers' speech as a whole was not to-
tally outside the ambit of the first amendment's protection, 32 the lower
court had erred in applying the balancing test to the entire questionnaire,
as most of the speech was better characterized as an employee
grievance.' 
33
The lower court had determined that because Myers' questions con-
cerned the effective functioning of a public agency, the issues addressed
were matters of public concern and the questionnaire was protected
126. 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983).
127. Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 758 (E.D. La. 1981). In a characterization that
would later be echoed in Justice Brennan's dissent in Connick, the lower court stated,
"[tiaken as a whole, the issues presented in the questionnaire relate to the effective function-
ing of the District Attorney's Office and are matters of public importance and concern. My-
ers' expression constitutes protected speech." Id
128. Connick, 103 S. Ct. at 1687-88.
129. Id at 1687.
130. Id at 1689. The Court concluded that the questionnaire as a whole did not consti-
tute speech on a matter of public concern. The question dealing with pressure to work on
political campaigns, however, was characterized as touching upon a matter of public con-
cern, and thus Myer's speech was not completely beyond the realm of protected speech. Id
at 1691.
131. Id. at 1691.
132. Id. at 1690.
133. Id. at 1693-94.
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speech. 134 On appeal to the Supreme Court, Connick argued that Myers'
questionnaire addressed only internal office matters and was not in any
manner to be considered speech on a matter of public concern. 135 Re-
jecting both of these absolute characterizations, the Court constructed a
continuum along which any given statement by a public employee could
fall-from speech which has so little value that the state could prohibit
it, 136 to speech on matters of vital interest to the electorate.137 The Court
held that to identify speech as protected, it is not enough to characterize
the speech as falling generally within the realm of a matter of public con-
cern. Instead, "[wihether an employee's speech addresses a matter of pub-
lic concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a
given statement, as revealed by the whole record."' 31 Justice White stated
that it was against this standard that Myers' questionnaire was to be
evaluated. '
39
Of the fourteen questions in Myers' survey,' 40 the Supreme Court held
that only the question regarding pressure to work for office-supported can-
didates touched directly upon a matter of public concern. 4'' The other
thirteen questions did not involve matters of public concern because they
related to the level of trust in supervision, office morale, and the fairness of
transfers. '42 The Court determined that pressure to work on political cam-
paigns was "a matter of interest to the community upon which it is essen-
134. Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 758 (E.D. La. 1981) (stating that a review of
the contents of the questionnaire shows that the issues addressed by the questions are, con-
sidered as a whole, matters of public concern).
135. Connick, 103 S. Ct. at 1688.
136. Id. at 1690. The Court referred to its classification of obscenity as failing within the
"narrow and well defined class" of speech totally lacking in first amendment protection. See
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
137. Connick, 103 S. Ct. at 1689. According to the Court, an example of such a matter is
Pickering's letter to the newspaper concerning allocation of school funds.
138. Id. at 1690.
139. Id. The approach taken by the Court thus categorizes speech as protected or unpro-
tected based in part on the content of the speech. For a criticism of content-based analysis
of free speech, see Chevigny, Philosophy of Language and Free Expression, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 157 (1980).
140. Connick, 103 S. Ct. at 1694 (Appendix A). Questions I through 5 asked employees
to describe their experience with office transfers. Questions 6 through 9 asked employees
about the office "rumor mill" and its effect on morale. Question 10 asked for an assessment
of the supervisory staff. Question 11 asked whether employees were pressured to work on
political campaigns for office supported candidates. Finally, questions 12 through 14 solic-
ited comments on the need for a grievance committee, office morale, and any other issue of
concern to the employees. The full text of the questionnaire is set forth supra note 18.
141. 103 S. Ct. at 1691.
142. Id at 1690.
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tial that public employees be able to speak out freely."' 143 Justice White
concluded that Pickering required the Court to balance the employee's
right to speak on unwilling participation in political campaigns against the
state's right to maintain the efficiency of the service by removing a disrup-
tive employee.'" Resolving the balance in favor of the state, the majority
held that the limited first amendment interest attaching to this one ques-
tion did not require Myers' supervisor to tolerate disruptive conduct.
45
Justice Brennan, writing the dissenting opinion in Connick, disagreed
with Justice White's characterization of Myers' questionnaire as a griev-
ance. In his view, the majority's approach was flawed because the Court
defined a matter of public concern by examining the content, form, and
context of the statement. 46 The context in which the statement is made is
considered twice, first in determining the threshold issue of whether the
speech is a matter of public concern, and again in determining whether
there was detrimental impact on efficiency of the public service under the
Pickering test. Although the dissent did not criticize the examination of
context with regard to the statement's detrimental impact on efficiency,
Justice Brennan questioned the role that context played in the majority's
evaluation of speech as a matter of public concern. 47 According to the
dissent, classifying a particular statement by a public employee as a matter
of public concern does not depend on where or why it was said.' 48 Indeed,
the majority noted that in Givhan the "right to protest . . . a matter of
public concern is not forfeited by [the] choice of a private forum.' 4 9 In
the dissent's view, Givhan clearly held that where the employee chose to
express her views had nothing to do with the determination that the matter
was one of public concern.' 5o
Justice Brennan's definition of a matter of public concern would extend
143. Id. at 1691. In holding that question 1 I constituted a matter of public concern, the
Court noted that pressure to work for political candidates exerted by the state on the unwill-
ing public employee is a coercion in violation of first amendment freedoms. The Court cited
its previous rejection of this coercion in Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1980) and
Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 372-73 (1976).
144. Connick, 103 S. Ct. at 1691-92.
145. Id. at 1693-94.
146. Id. at 1695-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 1696. The dissent agreed with the majority that "how and where a public
employee expresses his views are relevant" in applying the Pickering test, but only in consid-
ering the detrimental impact on the employer. Here, the majority was, in effect, giving
double weight to the context in which the statement was made, thus giving an unduly restric-
tive definition of a matter of public concern. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1691 n.8 (citing Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415-16).
150. Connick, 103 S. Ct. at 1697.
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to statements made by a public employee which implicate "the govern-
ment's interest as an employer."' 15 ' Agreeing with the district court, the
dissent maintained that Myers' questionnaire included matters of public
concern because it addressed issues that were of interest to those members
of the electorate who wanted to develop informed opinions about the oper-
ation of a government agency.1
5 2
According to Justice Brennan, by limiting the subjects which may be
classified as matters of concern to the public, the majority had also "imper-
missibly" narrowed the subjects upon which public employees may speak
"without fear of retaliatory dismissal."' 53 Acknowledging the Court's fear
of increased litigation over claims that a public employee had been fired
for exercise of free speech, Justice Brennan stated that the solution was not
to narrowly define a matter of public concern. 154 Rather, he suggested, the
Pickering test already contains an adequate balancing of interests in which
sufficient weight can be given to the public's interest in efficient perform-
ance of government functions. 5 5 Furthermore, according to the dissent,
the Court had increased the risk of retaliatory termination, thus deterring
employees from future criticism of the management of their public
agencies. 156
Clearly, one effect of Connick was to define a matter of public concern.
In the dissent's view, that definition constituted a narrowing of public em-
ployee's protected speech. But as further examination of Connick reveals,
its effect is not limited to a narrowing of the definition of a matter of p.ublic
concern. Indeed, even assuming an employee can demonstrate that the
speech in question was a matter of public concern, the Connick decision
has increased the difficulty of passing the Pickering test as well.
B. Application of the Pickering Test to the Narrowed Connick Definition
Under Connick, the Pickering balancing test should only be applied
once speech has been characterized as a matter of public concern."' Be-
cause Myers' question regarding political pressure to work on political
campaigns was an issue of public concern, application of the Pickering test
was appropriate to determine whether Myers' interest in circulating the
151. Id at 1695.
152. Id at 1698.
153. Id at 1696.
154. Id. at 1699.
155. Id
156. Id. at 1702 (as a result of the deterrence on free speech, "the public will be deprived
of valuable information with which to evaluate the performance of elected officials").
157. Id at 1689. For a discussion of the Pickering test, see supra notes 68-90 and accom-
panying text.
1984]
Catholic University Law Review
questionnaire outweighed the government's interest in promoting the effi-
ciency of the service.
The Connick Court began its application of the Pickering test by declar-
ing that the lower court had imposed "an unduly onerous burden" on the
state by requiring it to justify Myers' discharge.' 58 Under the approach
used by the district court, the burden of proof rested first with Myers and
later shifted to the state. Myers initially had to show that her speech was
protected as addressing a matter of public concern. Then, if she success-
fully met this showing, she had to show that her protected conduct was a
substantial factor in the decision to fire her. If Myers could carry the ini-
tial burden of showing her protected speech was a substantial factor in her
termination, then the burden shifted to the state to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that Myers would have been fired irrespective of her
protected conduct.' 5 9 According to Justice White, the first half of the dis-
trict court's equation, that Myers prove the speech was protected and a
motivating factor in her termination, was a misapplication of the Pickering
test.' 6° In his view, the effect of the lower court's application of the bal-
ancing test was to require the state to clearly demonstrate that Myers' con-
duct substantially interfered with the functioning of the office in
determining whether the speech was protected.' 6 ' This approach incor-
rectly required the employer to carry the burden of refuting the employee's
claim that the speech was protected-that is, it tipped the Pickering scales
unfairly in favor of the employee.
Correct application of Pickering, stated the Court, required a "particu-
larized balancing"' 62 of the employee's interest in commenting on a matter
of public concern and the state's interest in an efficient public service; thus,
the state's burden will vary depending on the nature of the speech in ques-
tion.163 Applying the Pickering test to the facts, the Connick Court ruled
that the particularized balancing weighed in the government's favor.' 64 It
held that Myers substantially interfered with her working relationship with
158. Connick, 103 S. Ct. at 1691.
159. Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 756-57 (E.D. La. 1981) (citing Mt. Healthy, 429
U.S. at 287, for the proper burden of proof).
160. Connick, 103 S. Ct. at 1691.
161. Id.
162. Id at 1692. Justice White stated that "[a]lthough such particularized balancing is
difficult, the courts must reach the most appropriate possible balance of the competing inter-
ests." Thus, while the lower court had engaged in an examination of the questionnaire, a
total reexamination of the speech by the Supreme Court was appropriate where resolution of
first amendment issues were involved. Id.
163. Id at 1691-92.
164. Id. at 1693-94. In holding that the balance was struck in Connick's favor, the Court
reiterated its refusal to establish a general standard against which public employee expres-
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Connick by circulating the questionnaire.165 Additionally, Myers' circula-
tion of the questionnaire caused a legitimate fear by Connick that the
smooth functioning of his office was in jeopardy.'66 Finally, the nature of
the conduct was speech only touching on a matter of public concern in
part, arising out of an issue in which Myers had a personal stake.' 67 Thus,
the Court held that the dissemination of the questionnaire which contained
only one question touching on a matter of public concern was conduct
sufficiently detrimental to the operation of the agency to justify Myers'
firing. 168 Justice White noted that a stronger showing of detrimental im-
pact would have been necessary to sustain the termination had Myers'
speech more substantially involved matters of public concern.
6 9
The majority also drew on the time, place and manner considerations in
Giphan. Taking those factors into account in the particularized balancing,
Justice White concluded that Myers' distribution of the questionnaire at
the worksite weighed in the government's favor, in that greater disruption
of work was likely.'70 The Court observed that in Pickering the employee
had engaged in the protected conduct of writing the letter to the newspaper
away from his place of employment, and the letter presumably was not
read by his coworkers while they were on the job. Here, Myers exercised
her rights to speech on the agency premises, thus lending credence to Con-
nick's fears that the functioning of his office was endangered.' 7 ' Further,
the Court held that actual disruption of the worksite need not be shown by
the employer. Rather, the government need only show a reasonable belief
that the employee's activity would cause such disruption.
72
As in Connick, the speech in Givhan took place at the worksite. 73 The
sion may be evaluated. As stated in Pickering, the enormity of factual variations which the
courts address in free speech cases makes such a standard impracticable. 391 U.S. at 569.
165. Connick, 103 S. Ct. at 1692. The Court stated, "Connick's judgment ... was that
Myers' questionnaire was an act of insubordination which interfered with working relation-
ships." Id. Although no actual disruption of the worksite was found by the Court, the fact
that disruption appeared likely to Myers' superiors was sufficient: "we do not see the neces-
sity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office
and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action." Id.
166. Id at 1693.
167. Id
168. Id. at 1693-94.
169. Id. at 1692-93. Thus, had the Court held that other questions on Myers' question-
naire were properly categorized as touching on matters of public concern, the showing of
disruption presumably would have been more critical.
170. Id. at 1693.
171. Id. The majority opinion noted that many of the questionnaires were distributed at
lunch time. Id. at n. 13.
172. Id at 1694.
173. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 412.
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Connick case also paralleled Givhan in that the disruption of the worksite
was a basis of the employer's argument that the speech was unprotected. 1
74
The majority distinguished Givhan, however, by characterizing the subject
matter of the speech in that case (racial discrimination) as "inherently of
public concern. '175
In balancing these facts, the Connick majority concluded that Myers had
not met her burden under Pickering. She did not prove that her interests
in circulating the questionnaire containing one matter of public concern
outweighed the state's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public
service. 176 Because Pickering resolved the protected conduct issue in the
state's favor, the Court held inapplicable the Mt. Healthy showing that the
employee would have been fired irrespective of her protected conduct."'
Thus, Connick could discharge Myers for her disruptive conduct and not
offend the first amendment.
78
The dissent argued that, even assuming that the questionnaire was prop-
erly characterized by the majority, the state did not meet its burden of
showing that its interests outweighed the employee's free speech rights. 1
79
Justice Brennan stated that the Court erred in its application of the Picker-
ing test when it held that Myers could be fired for her speech which
touched on a matter of public concern when the state made no showing
that her conduct actually disrupted the efficient functioning of the office. '
80
Although the lower court had found that the circulation of the question-
naire had no disruptive effect, the majority held that Connick's "reason-
able belief [that Myers' conduct] would disrupt the office" was enough to
174. Id. at n.2. The evidence of disruption of the worksite in Givhan included a showing
that Givhan downgraded papers of white students; walked out of a meeting and blew her car
horn to prevent others from continuing to meet; led a threatened strike; and prevented dis-
covery of a student with a weapon at school. Id
175. Connick at 1691 n.8. This characterization of allegedly racially discriminatory poli-
cies as a matter of inherent public concern raises the possibility that other issues might be so
categorized and thus might be subject to the Pickering standard. The Court, however, failed
to give any guidance on how to identify issues which are "inherently" of public concern.
The dissent contended that by closely examining some statements to determine if they are
matters of public concern and by classifying other subjects as inherently of public concern,
the majority created "two classes of speech of public concern." Id at 1696-97 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
176. Id. at 1694.
177. Id. at 1693. The Court noted that "Myers' reluctance to accede to the transfer order
was not a sufficient cause in itself for her dismissal, and thus did not constitute a sufficient
defense under Mt. Healthy." Id. But because the speech was not protected under the Pick-
ering test, the Court held that Mt. Healthy was inapplicable.
178. Id. at 1694.
179. Id. at 1696.
180. Id. at 1700 (previous applications of the Pickering test required more than mere
apprehension that speech will be disruptive).
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balance the Pickering scales in his favor. 8 ' The effect of the majority's
extreme deference to Connick's judgment, reasoned Justice Brennan, is an
improper application of the balancing test, because all that need be shown
by the state is the potential for disruption.'82 He stated that correct appli-
cation of the balancing test requires the Court to make its own determina-
tion on the effects of the speech, and not to merely accept the employer's
assertion that he feared a disruption.' 83 If the employer's judgment is to
be controlling, concluded the dissent, then public employees will not make
critical statements about their superiors, and the result will be an undue
chilling of their free speech rights.' 84
The dissent also differed with the majority on another aspect of its Pick-
ering analysis. The distinction drawn by the majority between Connick
and Givhan was not persuasive to Justice Brennan, who saw the Court de-
veloping two classes of speech: one that is protected because of its content,
form and context, and the other that is inherently protected.' 85 The dis-
sent asserted whether speech is properly characterized as involving a mat-
ter of public concern is not dependent on such a distinction.' 86
C. Implications of the Connick Decision
Justice Brennan's dissent in Connick is the better reasoned opinion. It is
more consistent with the Supreme Court's development of the first amend-
ment rights of public employees over the last thirty years. In Connick, the
181. Id. at 1701.
182. Id. In general, Pickering has been interpreted by the lower courts as requiring actual
evidence of disruption. See, e.g., Monsanto v. Quinn, 674 F.2d 990, 995 (3rd Cir. 1982);
Kim v. Coppin State College, 662 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1981); Williams v. Board of
Regents, 629 F. 2d 993, 1002-04 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub noma. Saye v. Williams, 452
U.S. 926 (1981); Tygrett v. Barry, 627 F.2d 1279, 1285-87 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
183. Connick, 103 S. Ct. at 1701.
184. Id. This result would be contrary to a frequently-cited purpose of the first amend-
ment: to ensure free discussion of matters of public concern. The Court has characterized
the free speech right in this context in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969) ("[iut is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace
of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail"); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)
("[wihatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the
free discussion of governmental affairs"); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270 (1964) (the first amendment expresses "a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials"). The view that the first amendment is primarily an instrument to en-
lighten democratic public decisionmaking is set forth in A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND
ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
185. Connick, 103 S. Ct. at 1696-97.
186. Id. at 1697.
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Supreme Court examined the question of what constituted a matter of
public concern under Pickering, and resolved that question narrowly in
two ways. First, the Court made it more difficult for an employee to show
his speech was protected, when it held that the context in which the state-
ment was made must be considered in classifying the speech as a matter of
public concern. Second, the Court made the Pickering balancing test more
difficult for the employee when it held that a supervisor's mere apprehen-
sion that disruption would result from the speech, regardless of whether
disruption actually occurred, is enough to tip the detrimental impact factor
in the state's favor.
In Connick, it appears that the Court may have been trying to reduce the
number of cases in which lower courts must engage in the delicate balanc-
ing of an employee's interest in free speech and an employer's interest in
efficiency. The desire that every personnel decision made by the state
should not be subjected to a constitutional challenge surfaced repeatedly
in Justice White's opinion,' 87 and it is clear that by narrowing the defini-
tion of a matter of public concern, the majority sought to distinguish this
case from Pickering and its progeny. In particular, the Court emphasized
in those cases the role of public employees as citizens who were comment-
ing on current political, social, and other community interest issues. 188
Contrasting the situation in Connick, the Court noted that Myers sought
the protection of the first amendment for a matter concerning her employ-
ment.' 89 Yet the questionnaire in Connick is not remarkably different
from the subjects found to constitute protected speech in the Court's prior
rulings. Certainly, the questionnaire in Connick was no more disruptive
than the statements found to be protected speech in Givhan. As noted in
the dissent, one possible ramification of narrowly defining a matter of pub-
lic concern may be to increase the risk of retaliatory termination.
187. The Court expressed fear that employees might cite routine personnel decisions as
rising to the level of free speech infringements, stating that "[g]overnment offices could not
function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter." Id at 1688. Such a
result would be an undue intrusion of the courts into the management of public agencies, the
Court held, as "government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices,
without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment." Id at
1690. The Court stated that "a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review
the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the
employee's behavior." Id The ramifications of defining a matter of public concern more
broadly would lead to a presumption "that all matters which transpire within a government
office are of public concern [and] would mean that virtually every remark-and certainly
every criticism directed at a public official-would plant the seed of a constitutional case."
Id at 1691.
188. Id. at 1689.
189. Id. at 1993.
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The concern expressed by the dissent may be justified, as reflected by a
Merit Systems Protection Board decision, Brown v. Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration,' ° rendered less than a month after the Supreme Court de-
cided Connick. In that case, the Board upheld the firing of a non-striking
air traffic controller who told a group of striking controllers to "stay to-
gether" after they went out.19 ' The Board cited Connick as the basis for its
decision, stating that application of its principles mandated the employee's
termination, as his speech was only tangentially related to a matter of pub-
lic concern.' 92 This indicates that the narrowed definition of a matter of
public concern has already begun to be applied by agencies responsible for
reviewing the termination of public employees.
Another possible effect of the Connick decision is the blurring of the
balancing test established by Pickering. The Court in Pickering refused to
establish a general standard to determine whether an employee's speech
was protected, 93 creating instead a balancing test identifying several fac-
tors to be weighed in considering the competing interests. '94 Although the
Pickering Court's reluctance to establish a general standard is understand-
able in light of its expressed concern with the impracticality of such an
approach,' 95 the lack of a uniform standard may produce opposite results
in similar cases, depending on the lower courts' understanding of Picker-
ing. 196 The distinction between protected speech and that which is outside
the realm of the first amendment may not have been clearly delineated for
the public employee under past applications of the Pickering test. With
the establishment in Connick of a new test to determine what constitutes a
matter of public concern, 9 7 and with the Court's additional allusion to
certain subjects as inherently of public concern, 98 the task of determining
the bounds of protected speech arguably becomes even more difficult for
employees and employers alike. The task now falls to the lower courts and
190. MSPB Docket No. NY 075281F1457, slip op. (May 19, 1983).
191. Id. at 2.
192. Id. at 12 ("the appellant's limited first amendment interest does not require that the
agency, in a time of national emergency [the air traffic controllers' strike of 1981] tolerate
conduct which it reasonably believed would ... undermine its ability [to function]").
193. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569.
194. Id at 568.
195. Id
196. Note, supra note 100, at 1003 ("[c]ases since Pickering have shown that the applica-
tion of the balancing test may produce divergent results in similar, if not parallel, factual
situations"); contra, Stevens, supra note 33 at 233 ("Ic]ourts have tended to strictly follow the
guidelines set forth in Pickering for harmonizing an educator's freedom of expression with a
school's interest in efficiency").
197. Connick, 103 S. Ct. at 1691-92.
198. Id. at 1696 n.8.
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to future litigants to examine statements of public employees to determine
where on the Supreme Court's continuum the speech may fall, or alterna-
tively, whether they address a matter of public concern.
Thus, although the Court expressed the desire that every employee
grievance not be litigated as a first amendment issue, 199 one result of Con-
nick could be to increase litigation of these issues. The Pickering standard
has undergone continued refinement over the last decade; the Connick de-
cision may make understanding of the subjects to which that standard ap-
plies more elusive. Indeed, it has been argued that understanding the
Pickering standard was already difficult for the public employee.2"' If that
premise is correct, then the effect of Connick may well be to further cloud
the employee's understanding of the limits of his free speech. Such a lack
of understanding may continue to spur litigation in this area.
III. CONCLUSION
In tracing the Court's rulings on the exercise of first amendment rights
for public employees, it appears that Pickering was the high-water mark.
The cases leading to Pickering gradually established the right of public
employees to be free of unduly restrictive loyalty oaths and to express
themselves on issues of public importance. The cases after Pickering show
an increasing concern by the Court that public employers retain the right
to control their organizations, even at the risk of limiting their employees'
speech. Connick is significant because it tips the Pickering scales substan-
tially in the employer's favor through its restrictive definition of a matter
of public concern and its relatively pro-employer approach to the particu-
larized balancing of the competing interests of the parties. Whether Con-
nick will have the severe chilling effect on the expression of employee
dissatisfaction and disagreement foreseen by Justice Brennan must await
future applications of this new standard.
Stephen Allred
199. Id. at 1691 ("while as a matter of good judgment, public officials should be recep-
tive to constructive criticism offered by their employees, the First Amendment does not re-
quire a public office be run as a roundtable for employee complaints over internal office
affairs").
200. For an expression of this view, see Note, supra note 100, at 1018.
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